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Religion and America surveys the "religious moment" in contemporary Ameri-
can culture in order to evaluate the health of spiritual life in a predominantly 
secular era. Several writers address the failure of academics and critics to 
anticipate fundamental changes in the shape of American religion in the past two 
decades. Scholars in the 1950s expected both the emergence of "secular religion" 
and the waning influence of religious commitment in American society. "Instead, 
surveying conditions today," noted Stephen Graubard, in the preface to the issue 
of Daedalus in which many of the articles originally appeared, "they find the 
'secular' paradigm denied, religion increasingly suffused throughout the culture, 
and many of the most traditional beliefs enjoying new importance in large 
subcultures of the country."1 While fundamentalist churches have grown in 
numbers and visibility, moreover, the liberal mainline churches have experienced 
a decline. Although the authors disagree about the potential revitalization of 
theology in public discourse, most agree that "religion continues to speak to the 
central issues of political order, however far privatization, secularization, and 
nostalgia have progressed. " This useful book defines the parameters of an ongoing 
debate about the nature of religious belief in modern society, but it offers few 
solutions. It is therefore nicely complemented by Harvey Cox's Religion in the 
Secular City, a. bold and thoughtful answer to the dilemmas faced by believers in late 
twentieth century America. 
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To focus on the "religious moment , " one must have an understanding of how 
modernity came into being, and on this issue, anthropologist Mary Douglas offers 
some insightful and highly critical remarks. An almost romantic view of pre-
modernity, an assumption that premoderns could believe because science had not 
yet removed mystery and wonder from their cosmology, Douglas argues, has 
prevented academics from accurately understanding the transition to twentieth 
century religious sensibilities. Thus cultural bias has imposed the model of 
secularization on this process, and it does not adequately explain historical 
transformation in all times and places. "Some premoderns," she writes, "a re 
indeed organized according to the stereotype, in highly ascriptive social institu-
tions. But some of them are as mobile, footloose, and uncommitted as any modern 
academic. Some have been gripped in the throngs of bureaucracy; some have been 
ruthlessly competitive individualists."2 Although Douglas does not advance an 
alternative mode of analyzing the transmission of religious culture through time 
and space, she does raise serious methodological questions about how students of 
religion have differentiated premodern from contemporary society. In addition, 
she points to the need for both a broader comparative framework and a deeper 
historical perspective in the field of religious studies. 
Several of the articles in Religion and America attempt to provide a historical 
context for the study of modern religious movements. Frank Manuel places the 
current politicization of Judaism in perspective by examining the Enlightenment 
thinkers' reassessment of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. 
George Marsden analyzes the historical development of fundamentalism in the 
twentieth century and finds in its theology elements of both modernism and 
antimodernism. Edwin S. Gaustad traces the conflict between fundamentalists 
and liberals and concludes that while liberal sensibilities may be in eclipse, they 
have not been discredited. And in a compelling examination of the social functions 
of Christian thought since the eighteenth century, Wolfgang Schluchter suggests 
that two dominant themes—privatization and depoliticization—may yet be suc-
cessfully challenged by the resurgence of a messianic vision. Each of these articles 
focuses on the relationship between past religious movements and contemporary 
concerns.3 
Religion and America effectively surveys the best of current scholarship on the 
significance of religion in modern American culture, and it offers readers a useful 
cross-section of work in the field. Ironically, however, the academic focus reflects a 
notable silence on the very forces which are transforming the religious scene in the 
United States. The categories of analysis—Protestant, Catholic, Jew, liberal, 
fundamentalist—are for the most part quite traditional. Conspicuously absent is 
any discussion of recent developments in feminist theology, the church-based 
peace and sanctuary movements, the contribution of black institutions to Ameri-
can religious life or the history of unbelief. Academic concerns focus on categories 
of belief and the waning power of the theological voice in public discourse. The 
essays in this volume constitute a view of the religious moment from the academic 
establishment in America, and the authors do not convey any sense that the 
fundamental changes which scholars failed to predict for the 1980s actually signify 
that new ways of understanding the relationship of religious experience to 
everyday life are in the offing. 
Harvey Cox carries this discussion onto new terrain, however, by suggesting 
that the modern or liberal religious synthesis is irrelevant and that a postmodern 
theology is in the making.4 No one could be more surprised than Cox about the 
renewal of religious commitment in contemporary society. In his 1965 book The 
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Secular City, Cox tried to come to terms with two overarching themes of modern 
social history: urbanization and secularization. Accepting both the demise of 
traditional Christian institutions, symbols and rituals, and urbanization as a 
fundamental reorientation in the way men and women live together, Cox tried to 
answer German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer's questions: " H o w do we speak of 
God without religion? How do we speak in a secular fashion of God?" He 
suggested that the "church has the responsibility to be the servant and healer of 
the city."5 Because he wrote in the mid-1960s, Cox's social context was an urban 
environment fraught with racial and ethnic tension, inequality and poverty. To 
speak of God without religion, he contended, the church must subordinate its 
concerns with institutions, symbols and rituals and immerse itself in the social 
problems of the secular city's inhabitants. In 1965 Cox understood the urban 
environment as a given, and he assigned believers a role as healers, not creators of 
the social order. 
Religion in the Secular City is a very different book. The liberal tradition with its 
insistence on the separation of religion and politics and of church and state, its 
celebration of individualism and its administrative structures—the theological 
foundation of the secular city as Cox conceived it—no longer satisfies the 
postmodern world. " T h e failure of modern theology," Cox declares, "is that it 
continues to supply plausible answers to questions that fewer and fewer people are 
asking, and inadvertently perpetuates the social bases of oppression."6 Cox has 
not articulated an alternative, but he has written a convincing obituary for the 
theological consensus that has dominated Western culture since the mid-nine-
teenth century. 
Modernist theologians from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Karl Barth shared the 
common goal of attempting to make the "Christian message credible to what they 
understood as the modern mind . " Their target was the troubled thinker, the 
skeptic, the deist and the atheist, people who had declared themselves intellectually 
unable to believe. In the hands of the modernists for example, the harsh 
predestination theology of the Calvinists was rendered palatable, for they defined 
God as "universal, equally approachable by all and available to all. There was 
little room in modern theology either for a partisan God who takes sides in 
historical struggles, or for a God who has to be sought in radically dissimilar ways 
by different peoples" (Cox, 176, 178). Although the God of the modernists 
presided beneficently over this world, he did not engage actively on the side of 
people struggling to create new social political forms. Consequently modern 
theology became increasingly concerned with the life of the inner spirit, with 
individual relationships between believers and their God, and its theologians did 
not try to relate their ideas to the great social and economic transformations of the 
nineteenth century which ushered in industrial capitalism and its attendant 
bourgeois ideology. 
From the fringes of the modern world, however, the disinherited of American 
society and the peasant communities of Latin America, a new constituency now 
challenges the modernist perspective. In the base communities of Latin America, 
peasants and priests are using their religious traditions as a means of understand-
ing the origins of inequality and oppression. The result of this reunification of 
religion and politics, it seems, is a powerful critique of the capitalist and 
imperialist structures which have made their world what it is. In the United States 
two constituencies are questioning the modernist synthesis. Mainline churches are 
active in the peace and anti-nuclear movements. Cox provides a telling example in 
the Roman Catholic parish of St. Francis Xavier, Hyannis, Massachusetts, which 
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once was a house of worship for the Kennedy family, and is now involved in the 
resistence to the American presence in El Salvador. More significant for Cox's 
point of view, however, is the resurgence of the fundamentalist movement in 
America, a development which he insists has essentially altered the religious 
landscape in this country. 
Although radicals and American fundamentalists differ in goals and strategies, 
both reject the separation of religion and politics inherent in modernist thought. 
Politics, moreover, occupies a greatly enlarged realm, for both groups have 
become sensitive to what might be called the political dimension of everyday life. 
Like feminists who discovered that patriarchal relationships determined a wide 
range of daily experience in both personal and public life, both fundamentalists 
and liberationists are critical of power relationships which inhibit the acceptance of 
their religious values as enforceable guidelines for everyday behavior. Fundamen-
talists yearn for a political order in which the state legislates their views on divorce, 
abortion and school prayer. Liberation theology addresses such issues as the 
distribution of wealth and political power, the delivery of health and educational 
services and the status of women. In this context, the church which once made its 
exit from the political realm must now find its way back if it is to have any 
relevance in the postmodern era. 
Unlike most academic commentators, Cox eschews a condescending treatment 
of fundamentalism and tries to understand it as a subculture with its own ideology. 
A series of pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915 designated fundamentals 
of the Christian faith as "belief in the deity of Christ, the Virgin Birth, the bodily 
Resurrection of Christ, the imminent Second Coming, the substitutionary 
atonement, and—very emphatically—the verbal inspiration and inerrancy of the 
whole Bible" (44).7 Fundamentalists dedicated themselves to the restoration of a 
faith undefiled by modern refinements and innovations, and they saw the past as a 
golden age of belief to be replicated in the present. Similarly, in political matters 
today they tend to ally with conservative causes. Followers of Moral Majority's 
Jerry Falwell, for example, seek a return to the traditional patriarchal family, 
support a strong national defense and are pro-life and pro-Israel. They press for 
the equality of creationist and scientific accounts of the origins of the earth because 
they believe that the Biblical account can be supported scientifically. Fundamen-
talists are critical of the authority of modern science not because they reject 
scientific explanation, but because they resent the elevation of technical expertise 
at the expense of divine revelation. In addition, they are suspicious of sprawling, 
modern urban environments which they claim alienate men and women not only 
from their spiritual natures, but also from the bonds of Christian community. This 
latter observation leads Cox to assume erroneously that the swelling ranks of the 
movement come from the rural poor. 
For all of his sympathy and perceptiveness, however, Cox offers a curious 
criticism of fundamentalism. Its fatal flaw is its inability to deal with religious 
pluralism, "its insistence that it is not 'sacred Scriptures' but one particular 
Scripture, not religious traditions but one tradition alone, that merits fidelity" 
(59). Ironically, Cox criticizes the fundamentalists' failure to accept pluralism, a 
concept which may be the modernists' most enduring contribution to Western 
culture. This assessment may be a measure of Cox's own ambivalent commitment 
to the liberal tradition, for he seems unable to imagine a society in which sectarian 
views can flourish with integrity.8 
The fundamentalist movement represents a widespread and popular dissatis-
faction with modernist ideas and therefore raises questions which the creators of a 
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postmodern faith will have to answer. Fundamentalist theologians have succeeded 
in placing back on the agenda problems which modernists thought they had 
resolved. Academic disdain for fundamentalism, Cox claims, has prevented 
scholars from discerning the immense respect of the movement's leaders and 
teachers for science and reason. While liberals argue that science and religion deal 
with mutually exclusive realms of knowledge, fundamentalists insist that " they 
can complement each other as ways of knowing a single order of reality. " A 
postmodern faith, Cox writes, "will agree with the fundamentalists that ultimately 
people will not be satisfied with the separation of will and intellect, thought and 
feeling, affect and cognition which has informed the modern liberal understand-
ing ." Much of Cox's commentary on the movement makes it seem like the 
vanguard of theological transformation (54, 58). 
Cox's respectful and intelligent treatment of the fundamentalists enables him 
to appreciate both their history and achievements, but ultimately he argues that 
their contribution to the making of a postmodern theology will be insignificant. 
Because they have not formulated a critical perspective on the managers of 
corporate capitalism, the leaders of the movement are out of touch with the 
interests of rural poor workers who are attracted to the movement. Second, the 
emphasis on the imminent Second Coming of Christ discourages organizing to 
change the world of the here and now. Third, the romance with the electronic 
media is a self-defeating strategy, devoid of the face-to-face contact which 
antimodernists admire about the presecular, preurban world. Ultimately, it seems, 
the fundamentalists will be the architects of their own irrelevance. 
By the end of the first section of the book, readers may suspect that Cox has set 
the fundamentalists up as a foil for the heroes of his story, the members of base 
communities in Latin America. While the fundamentalists defend capitalism as 
the "American way of life," radicals draw upon the same Christian tradition to 
fight economic exploitation and political repression. If Falwell is the archtypical 
fundamentalist, Ernesto Cardenal, Nicaragua's Minister of Cultural Affairs, is his 
radical counterpart. Cardenal studied under Thomas Merton at Columbia 
University (1947-49) but returned to his native Nicaragua to join the opposition to 
Samoza. A mystic and a poet, Cardenal founded a monastery which served as a 
center for prayer, study and work in the local community. Throughout the 1970s 
Cardenal urged Nicaraguans toward a non-violent revolution, but sustained 
attacks on his community convinced him of the need to join the Sandinistas. He is 
now a central actor in the reconstruction of Nicaraguan society and politics. 
For leftist critics, the most significant failing of modern theology is the 
"consignment of God and religion to the inner subjective world of the individual" 
(128). Using Cardenal's community as a model, Cox suggests that the postmodern 
synthesis will bring about the réunification of mysticism and politics, art and 
political criticism and piety and power. Postmodern faithful will gather neither in 
the coercive religious structures of the past nor in churches run by clerics, but in 
democratically organized Christian communities dedicated to social justice and 
equality. Lay leadership and folk piety will be at the heart of the new movement. 
Religion in the Secular City is an odd statement for a liberal, mainstream 
American academic; critical evaluations of capitalist social relations are not 
characteristic of the American religious establishment. Cox follows a quasi-
Marxist trajectory, for he suggests that bourgeois religious hegemony will wither 
away, and a new theology which articulates the needs of the wretched of the earth 
will emerge to take its place. In contrast, commentators have customarily argued 
that the faithful of the United States share a commitment to a common heritage of 
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peculiarly American religious values which transcends differences of class, race, 
ethnicity and gender. In addition, Cox's observation that modern theology tends 
to isolate religious experience within the personal and subjective realm is a 
compelling judgment on the alienating power of individualism in American 
culture. For these reasons alone the book deserves a wide audience. 
From a historian's point of view, however, the books suffers from two 
shortcomings. First, Cox is not sufficiently appreciative of the complexity of 
American religious history. While religious values have provided a rationale for 
relations between labor and capital in the modern era, the same tradition has also 
been a source of resistence to them. Andrew Carnegie may have drawn upon 
Protestant theology to inculcate habits of temperance, thrift, industry and 
punctuality—the hallmarks of a disciplined workforce—but labor activists have 
also marshalled the same traditions to support collective resistance to employers. 
Both slaves and slaveholders made use of Biblical history to assist them in the tasks 
of survival and domination, respectively. Biblical images of women have supported 
both traditional female roles and radical departures from them. Religious 
argument has functioned not only as an inhibitor of the political consciousness of 
Americans in the past, but also as a catalyst, yet Cox tells the story as if the forces 
of secular modernity triumphed unopposed by people steeped in religious 
traditions.9 
To be sure, the failing is not Cox's alone; it is endemic to the field of American 
religious history. Scholars have been so enamoured of the emergence of religious 
pluralism and the separation of church and state that a refined version of the 
progress model of historical transformation still exists in their field. Given their 
reluctance to see the religious arena as a context in which fundamental questions of 
social and political order are contested, it is not surprising that Cox sees only the 
hegemonic function of religion in past time.1 0 
This point raises a second criticism. For Cox the real center of hope for the 
development of a postmodern theology is in Latin America, and he does not 
identify a similar movement in the United States. Curiously, he ignores one of the 
most visibly political folk movements of the past three decades in America—the 
black civil rights movement. Based in the folk traditions of Southern evangelical 
religious culture, the civil rights movement joined religious belief and political 
action into a powerful indictment of race and class relations in America. Black 
theology and religious institutions provided a base for resistance to racial 
domination, and the movement's success casts doubt on the passive acceptance of 
modernist ideas among groups who have long inhabited the fringes of power in 
American society. Cox's insensitivity to radical religious traditions in the Ameri-
can past, it seems, has inhibited his appreciation of their present significance. 
The importance of Cox's insights go beyond theology to the nature of 
American democratic thought itself. In 1955 Louis Hartz argued that because 
Americans had never had to contest a feudal regime they were incapable of 
understanding or sympathizing with Marxist ideological perspectives. American 
culture depoliticized ideological debate and coopted fundamentally conflicting 
positions into Lockean liberal configurations. Consequently Americans could 
debate only means, never ends. Hartz 's analysis has been mistakenly identified 
with the interpretive framework of the consensus historians, but in reality he held a 
tragic view of historical process. The liberal tradition dominated American social 
thought so completely, he argued, that Americans had been rendered incapable of 
recognizing it as an ideology.11 In his analysis of liberation theology, Cox strains 
against the liberal tradition, but in his commentary on fundamentalism he reveals 
88 
that, try as he might, he cannot ultimately transcend the limitations of the 
modernist perspective. 
To return to the questions raised in Religion and America, scholars in the 1950s 
may have failed to predict the current popularity of traditional religious institu-
tions and beliefs as well as radical movements because they did not foresee the 
increasing significance of race, class, gender and ethnicity in the shaping of 
religious experience. Nor did they understand the roots from which these 
movements sprang. Largely influenced by Durkheim, they defined religion in 
integrative terms; that is, they assumed that religious belief functioned to 
internalize the authority of any particular society in the believer.12 Cox suggests 
that religious commitment for both fundamentalists and liberationists serves the 
opposite purpose, for it empowers them to resist structures of authority in their 
respective political and personal environments. This single observation is the most 
compelling to date by any American theologian about the making of a postmodern 
religious sensibility. Cox's inability to move definitively out of the camp of liberal 
academic commentators, however, may leave readers wondering if Hartz wasn't 
right after all. 
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